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Abstract
We consider the optimal factor income taxation in a standard R&D
model with technical change represented by an increase in the variety
of intermediate goods. Redistributing the tax burden from labor to
capital will increase the employment rate in equilibrium. This has
opposite e⁄ects on two distortions in the model, one due to monopoly
power, the second to the incomplete appropriability of the bene￿ts
of inventions. Their relative momentum determines the sign of the
welfare e⁄ect. We show that, for parameter values consistent with
available estimates, taxing capital more heavily than labor can be
welfare increasing.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines how the tax burden should be distributed between capital
and labor income in a basic R&D model of endogenous growth.1 The main
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1The taxation of capital involves many di⁄erent kind of taxes, some on stocks (eg wealth
tax, tax on bequests, property tax of capital), some on the income from savings (from the
corporate income tax, the tax on interest and dividends, the taxation of capital gains). By
a tax on capital income in our model we mean a tax on income from savings. In the model
there is no capital in the physical sense, but wealth accumulates in the form of of patents.
1message of the extensive literature on the optimal taxation of factor incomes,
as summarised by Atkeson et al. (1999) is the following: taxing capital is a bad
idea in the long-run.2
The result is surprisingly general and robust in a variety of settings, including
models where capital-holders are distinct from workers (Judd 1985), overlapping
generations models (Garriga 2001 and Erosa and Gervais 2002) and models with
human capital accumulation (Jones et al. 1997). We add that most quantitative
investigations suggest that capital taxes should be zero or very small even in the
short run (see Atkeson et al. 1999). The literature on endogenous growth tends
to reinforce the message that capital income should not be taxed, as taxing it
would have adverse e⁄ects on the rate of growth which would compound over
time (see the survey in Jones and Manuelli 2005).
We check if the message also holds in a standard model of horizontal innova-
tion, with an in￿nitely lived representative agent, originally proposed by Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) and known as the "lab-equipment model". Given its
￿ exibility and simplicity this model has provided a tractable framework for an-
alyzing a wide array of issues in economic growth.3 Entrepreneurs spend a ￿xed
cost in order to develop new intermediate goods, over the production of which
they then enjoy eternal monopoly power. Output in the ￿nal goods production
sector is linear in the number of intermediate goods used so unbounded growth
is possible. There are two ine¢ ciencies in the model, a static one stemming from
market power in the intermediate goods sector, and a dynamic one stemming
from the uncomplete appropriability of the social surplus from innovating.
We extend this benchmark model by explicitly analysing the decision to
supply labor as well as by introducing government spending. We assume that
the only ￿scal instruments are linear income taxes, that the government ￿xes
the amount of revenue it wants to generate as a ￿xed fraction of income and
that it balances the budget at all times. The tax rates (i.e. the labor income
tax rate and the interest income tax rate) must adjust endogenously.
This gives what has become known as a ￿Ramsey Problem￿ : maximize social
welfare through the choice of taxes subject to the constraints that ￿nal alloca-
tions must be consistent with a competitive equilibrium with distortionary taxes
and that the given tax system raises a pre-speci￿ed amount of revenue.
In a model with endogenous growth, the common trend between output
and government expenditure cannot be ignored, so what we pre-specify here is
2More precisely the Ramsey tax system advocates a high tax on initial capital stock (or
on capital income in the initial period) and a zero tax on capital income in future times; see,
e.g., Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and Chari et al. (1994). However, the Ramsey results
hinge on the assumption that the government can commit to zero tax in the future, as there
is a problem of dynamic inconsistency.
3See the excellent survey in Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a selection of the wide range
of applications of this model.
2the ratio between these variables and not the absolute amount of tax revenue.
Furthermore, to isolate the e⁄ects of taxation, rather than of more complex
public action, we assume government revenues do not directly a⁄ect the marginal
utility of private consumption and leisure or the marginal productivity of factors
of production.
In this setting we derive an expression for the optimal tax rate on capital
income, whose value will depend on the speci￿cations of tastes and techonology.
We then move to the analysis of calibrated versions of the model, and ￿nd
that the tax rate on capital is never zero in our model, and often similar ￿
indeed for some plausible parameterizations even higher ￿to the tax rate on
labor income.4
To understand intuitively our ￿ndings, consider that if the shift in the tax
burden from capital to labor increases employment and as a consequence the pro-
ductivity of each di⁄erentiated product, the demand for the product is increased.
The production of each intermediate will then be more pro￿table, and the dis-
tortion due to monopoly power lower. Also, the invention activity, ￿nanced
by household saving, is more rewarding the greater the prospective demand,
and therefore pro￿ts from a new product. So a higher employment increases
coeteris paribus the return to saving and linearly increases growth. However
the increase in the tax on capital which is the counterpart to the reduction in
the tax on labor directly discourages savings and growth, thus worsening the
dynamic ine¢ ciency. A third distortion in the model is created by government
expenditure itself as agents do not internalize the fact that higher income will
lead to extra public public expenditure. Taxing both labor and capital income
reduces this distortion.5 For reasonable parameters￿values the interplay be-
tween the various channels through which the tax program has e⁄ects means
that the optimal tax on capital is not only positive but very sizable￿ given the
levels of public spending observed in advanced economies.
Studies based on R&D models similar to ours have generally found that
taxing savings is detrimental to growth and welfare (e.g. Lin and Russo 1999
and 2002, Zeng and Zhang 2002). In particular our work complements Zeng
and Zhang (2007), who study ￿scal issues adopting our same speci￿cation of
the horizontal innovation model but focus on a di⁄erent issue. More speci￿cally
they compare the e⁄ects of subsidizing R&D investment to the e⁄ects of subsi-
dizing ￿nal output or subsidizing the purchase of intermediate goods in terms
of promoting growth. They consider distortionary taxation (i.e. taxes on labor
income) but abstract from taxes on interest income.
Our ￿ndings also contribute to the literature exploring the circumstances
under which optimal factor taxation may involve a non-zero tax rate on capital
4The analysis is undertaken in a closed economy context, but, as noted by Rebelo (1991), is
valid in a world of open economies connected by international capital markets if all countries
follow the worldwide tax system.
5See again Marrero and Novales (2007).
3income, thus bridging the gap between economic theory prescriptions and the
fact that in developed economies capital taxes are far from zero.6
A way in which taxing capital can be good is when government spending
increases the marginal productivity of capital, as in Baier and Glomm (2001),
Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), Guo and Lansing (1999),
Turnovsky (1996, 2000), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Chen and Lee (2006),
Chen (2007) and Zhang et al. (2008).7 More counter examples to the optimality
of a zero tax on physical capital can be found in human capital models (see Ben-
Gad 2003 and de Hek 2006). The presence of an informal sector the income
from which cannot be taxed or of other restrictions on the taxation of factors
are also grounds for the positive taxation of capital income (see Correia 1996,
Penalosa and Turnovsky 2005 and Reis 2011). Chamley (2001), Ho and Wang,
(2007), Hubbard and Judd (1986) and Imrohoroglu (1998) among others have
emphasized that if households face borrowing constraints and/or are subject to
uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, so that excessive savings arise, then the
optimal tax system will in general include a positive capital income tax. Asea
and Turnovsky (1998) and Kenc (2004) ￿nd that increasing the tax rate on
capital income may increase growth in a stochastic environment. Many papers
(eg Conesa and Garriga 2003, Cremer et al. 2003, Hendricks 2003, 2004, Erosa
and Gervais 2002, Song 2002, Uhlig and Yanagawa 1996 and Yakita 2003) show
that in life cycle/OLG models the optimal capital income tax in general is
di⁄erent from zero, as such tax can facilitate the intergenerational trasmission
of wealth. Conesa et al. (2008) quantitatively characterize the optimal capital
income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable
income shocks and ￿nd it to be signi￿cantly positive at 36 percent.
The arguments developed in these models as grounds for a positive rate of
capital taxation are unrelated to ours as we model a perfect foresight closed
economy with in￿nite lived agents, no e⁄ect of government expenditures on the
rate of return of private factors of production, no human capital accumulation,
no subsidies to investment. However, our paper like all in this literature, can
be seen as an example of the argument in Judd (1999) that it is the presence of
constraints (for the government or for the individuals) or suboptimal expendi-
ture choices that makes capital income taxation desirable. In other words, ours
are second-best results.
Often in the papers on taxation and growth, only the growth, not the wel-
fare e⁄ect of the tax experiments are calculated, if in the market equilibrium
growth is lower than optimal, because there is an implicit presumption that
higher growth means more welfare as, through compounding, growth e⁄ects al-
ways prevail over level e⁄ects. However while, as we show, in our model growth
6See McDaniel (2007) for recent estimates of e⁄ective tax rates on capital.
7In Zhang et al. (2008) the government should tax net capital income more heavily than
labor income, however this is because investment is subsidized at the same rate at which net
capital income is taxed.
4is ine¢ ciently low in the absence of taxes, even when the introduction of the
tax lowers growth there might be a positive welfare e⁄ect. In our calibrated ex-
amples, this counterintuitive e⁄ect arises with parameter choice well within the
range of selections studied in other settings, such as public ￿nance, quantitative
growth theory and business cycle analysis.
A complete assessment of the welfare e⁄ects of the tax program we consider
has to include an analysis of its e⁄ect on the dynamic properties of the model.
In fact it has recently been shown that factor taxes can a⁄ect the stability prop-
erties.of the dynamic equilibrium of a market economy. In particular, Ben-Gad
(2003), Palivos et al. (2005), Raurich (2001) Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997)
and Wong and Yip (2010) among others have shown that the introduction of
taxes and government spending may make the equilibrium exhibit local indeter-
minacy. However, this is not the case in this model, which, as we show, features
a unique unstable balanced growth path.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the model is
presented, in section 3 the general equilibrium conditions of the model are de-
scribed, section 4 analyzes the labor supply e⁄ect, the growth e⁄ect and the
welfare e⁄ect of shifting the tax burden from labor to capital. Section 5 presents
some calibrated examples and derives the optimal tax rates for various sets of
parameters, section 6 presents the social planner￿ s solution and section 7 con-
cludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendices.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
We assume that in the economy there is a continuum of length one of identical











where C is consumption, H labor, ￿ > 0 is the rate of time discount and 1=￿ > 0
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The following conditions ensure
non satiation of consumption and leisure:
h(H) > 0 (2)
and
(1 ￿ ￿)h0(H) < 0. (3)
Strict concavity of instantaneous felicity imposes:
(1 ￿ ￿)h00(H) < 0 (4)
8As Zeng and Zhang (2007) note, normalizing the population to unity removes from the





￿ h02 > 0. (5)
The instantaneous budget constraint consumers face is given by:
_ F = r(1 ￿ ￿r)F + ￿n(1 ￿ ￿r)N + w(1 ￿ ￿w)H ￿ C. (6)
Households derive their income by loaning entrepreneurs their ￿nancial wealth
F (of which all have the same initial endowment), by pro￿ts ￿n (net of the in-
terest payments) of the N ￿rms and by supplying labor H to ￿rms, taking the
interest rate r and the wage rate w as given. Capital income is taxed at the rate
￿r while labor income is taxed at the rate ￿w. Optimization at an interior point
implies that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption




w(1 ￿ ￿w)(￿ ￿ 1)
C
. (7)











= ￿ ￿ r(1 ￿ ￿r) (8)
where ￿ = c￿￿h is the shadow value of wealth. Given a no Ponzi game condition
the transversality condition imposes:
lim
t!1
￿F exp(￿￿t) = 0. (9)
2.2 Firms
In this economy there are a ￿nal goods sector and an intermediate goods sector.
The former is perfectly competitive, whereas the latter is monopolistic. R&D
activity leads to an expanding variety of intermediate goods. All patents have
an in￿nitely economic life, that is, we assume no obsolescence of any type of
intermediate goods.
The production function of ￿rm i in the ￿nal goods sector is given by:




where Y (i) is the amount of ￿nal goods produced and L(i) is labor used by ￿rm
i and x(i;j) is the quantity this ￿rm uses of the intermediate goods indexed by
j. For tractability both i and j are treated as continuous variables. We assume
0 < ￿ < 1. The ￿nal goods sector is competitive and we assume a continuum
of length one of identical ￿rms. We can then suppress the index i to avoid
notational clutter. Firms maximize pro￿ts given by




6where w is the wage rate and P(j) is the price of the intermediate good j. By








and labor demand by:




Since the ￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector are competitive and there are constant
returns to scale their pro￿ts are zero in equilibrium. In contrast the ￿rms which
produce intermediate goods with patent which they invent then earn monopoly
pro￿ts for ever. The cost of production of the intermediate good j, once it has
been invented, is given by one unit of the ￿nal good.
The present discounted value at time t of monopoly pro￿ts for ￿rm j, or in





(P(j) ￿ 1)x(j)e￿r(s;t)(s￿t)ds (14)
where r(s;t) is the average interest rate during the period of time from t to s.
The inventor of the jth intermediate good chooses P(j) to maximize (P(j) ￿
1)x(j) where x(j) is given by (12), so for each j, the equilibrium price is and
quantity are:










The price is higher than the marginal cost of producing good j, and the quantity
produced, x(j), is therefore lower than the socially optimal level. This is in fact
the ￿rst ine¢ ciency in the model, a straitforward consequence of market power
in the intermediate sector.






while plugging (17) in (13) we have:














A higher labor supply implies a higher quantity of each intermediate goods and
thus higher pro￿ts in equilibrium. This means there is an externality to labor
7in the model, because when deciding labor supply workers will not take into
account this positive e⁄ect on pro￿ts. So a tax program leading to increasing L
can increase welfare by reducing the ine¢ ciency due to monopolistic conditions.
In section 6 we show formally that in this market economy employment is always
lower than its e¢ cient level.
The cost of development of new products is ￿ and there is free entry in the
market for inventions. Intermediate goods ￿rms will push the price of a patent
to equate its cost. Here a second ine¢ ciency in the model appears, which is due
to an appropriability problem: only the discounted value of pro￿ts, as opposed
to all of social surplus originating from an invention, is taken into account when
deciding whether to pay for research leading to innovation, so that its pace will
be too low.










which allows us to interpret it from an asset pricing perspective. The return on
holding a blueprint, rV , is given by dividends ￿, plus the capital gains, i.e. the
change in its value V . In the appendix, we show that, in a growing economy,
we must have V = ￿ in equilibrium at all times, while ￿n = 0.9 But if V = ￿ at
all times, (20), given (19), implies that in equilibrium we will have:










The higher is labor supply the higher is the interest rate. As the sales of each
intermediate good and therefore pro￿ts are increasing in labor supply, for their
present discounted value to be equal to the given cost of an invention, the
interest rate will have to increase.
2.3 Government
We assume government consumption G equals a ￿xed fraction, g, of gross out-
put: G = gY . We rule out a market for government bonds and assume that the
government runs a balanced budget. The revenue from income taxes is used for
￿nancing expenditures. In equilibrium:
r￿rF + ￿wwL = gY (22)
where on the left-hand side we have in￿ ows and on the right-hand side we
have out￿ ows. Our assumption of a given g is made mainly for convenience but
the public expenditure components that might be seen as exogenous in actual
9Our proof is an extension to the case of a variable L, to the one o⁄ered in Acemoglu
(2009) for the case of a ￿xed L.
8economies (from public wages, the payments of interest on public debt etc.) are
far from zero and have remained fairly stable, as a percentage of output, over
the last decades. Marrero and Novales (2007) document this and show that
factor income taxes may be preferable to lump-sum taxes under the assumption
of a given g, as they allow an internalization of the fact that higher income will
lead to extra public spending. This simple e⁄ect is also at work in our model.
2.4 Market Equilibrium
In calculating the equilibrium in the ￿nal goods market, intermediate goods used
in production, xN, are subtracted from ￿nal production Y to obtain total value
added. All investment in the model is investment in research and development of
new intermediate goods ￿ _ N. The economy-wide resource constraint is therefore
given by:
Y ￿ xN = C + ￿ _ N + gY . (23)
We are now ready for the following:
De￿nition 1 In a competitive equilibrium individual and aggregate variables
are the same and prices and quantities are consistent with the (private) e¢ ciency
conditions for the households (6), (7), (8) and (9), the pro￿t maximization
conditions for ￿rms in the ￿nal goods sector, (12) and (13) (or 18), and for ￿rms
in the intermediate goods sector, (15) (or 16) and (21), with the government
budget constraint (22) and with the market clearing conditions for labor (H =
L), for wealth (F = V N), and for the ￿nal good, (23).
The following relationship between before-tax labor income and before-tax










Given this from the de￿nition of equilibrium we can now arrive at the following:
Proposition 2 The competitive equilibrium conditions in the model give rise








































If a balanced growth path (hence BGP) exists, variables grow at a constant
rate along this path, and in particular employment is constant at a value e L.
Given (26) we have:
Proposition 3 The condition for the existence of a BGP equilibrium in this
model in which all variables grow at the same rate is that (26) has a ￿xed point
e L between 0 and 1, implicitly de￿ned by B(e L) = 0, consistent with the TVC and
with a positive growth rate ￿ for capital and consumption given by:
￿ =
C1e L(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ ￿
￿
. (29)
Proof. From (7) and (18), in a BGP, i.e. when _ L = 0, C and N will grow at
the same rate. From (8) this is seen to be given by (29).
From (29) we see that BGP growth is linearly increasing in e L, as is the
interest rate, through (21). So if an increase in ￿r and a corresponding decrease
in ￿w induces a rise in e L, the e⁄ect on growth will not be proportional, and,
at least in theory, the net interest rate C1e L(1 ￿ ￿r) may increase rather than
decrease. Also, if the net interest rate decreases the e⁄ect on growth will be
lower the higher is ￿.
Restrictions on parameters ensuring existence of a BGP equilibrium will be
considered after introducing a speci￿c form for the function h. However for the
general case we can establish some interesting results on the uniqueness and
stability of the BGP, assuming existence.
Proposition 4 If ~ L de￿ned by B(~ L) = 0 exists, while either ￿ > 1, or ￿ < 1
and ￿w ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) are true, then B0(~ L) > 0:The BGP equilibrium is then
unique and locally determinate, and there is no transitional dynamics to it.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As the necessary conditions for B0(~ L) negative require unrealistic parame-
ters￿values (in particular a very low ￿ or a very high ￿w), from now on we
concentrate mainly on the case of a determinate and unique BGP equilibrium.
103 E⁄ects of Taxes
3.1 E⁄ect on labor
It is relatively simple to calculate the e⁄ect of taxes on employment in this
model because the wage rate does not vary with it. As said above equilibrium
labor supply ~ L can be expressed as the solution to B(~ L) = 0. The e⁄ect of
shifting the tax burden from labor to capital can be deduced by using the total
derivative of B(~ L) = 0 with respect to labor and the tax (￿r), keeping the ratio











With B0(~ L) > 0, the case on which we focus, this derivative signs as the





This is, in light of (7), the well known condition that consumption must be
higher than labor income for dynamic e¢ ciency. For ￿ > 1, we can easily see
that we will always have d~ L
d￿r > 0. We are therefore ready to state the following:
Proposition 5 An increase in the tax rate on capital income whose proceeds
are used to reduce the tax on labor income will increase employment, given
determinacy, if and only if
￿(￿￿1)h
h0 > ~ L. This condition is always satis￿ed if
￿ > 1.
If h0 > 0, i.e. ￿ > 1, then UcL > 0, i.e. leisure and consumption are substi-
tutes, so that taxing capital making consumption more attractive makes leisure
less attractive, helping to o⁄set the labor-leisure distortion due to labor income
taxation. The compensated (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply with respect to
















￿2 is positive if h0 > 0, i.e. if ￿ > 1, so
an increase in the net wage will produce a stronger e⁄ect on employment the
higher is ￿.
Since estimates tend to suggest for ￿ a value bigger than one we conclude
that in the model shifting the tax burden from labor to capital will push em-
ployment up. It may be interesting to note that this is consistent with empirical
evidence: the data for developed countries tend to show that the higher the tax
on labor income is the lower the yearly hours worked per adult are (see Ohanian
et al. 2008 and references therein).
113.2 E⁄ect on Growth























Not surprisingly the condition for the tax change to be growth increasing is
stricter than the condition for it to be employment increasing, because for
growth to increase we need the net interest rate to increase not just the gross
interest rate, which is a linear function of the employment rate. When ￿r > 0,
the condition for the policy to be growth increasing is that the elasticity of la-
bor supply with respect to the tax
d~ L=~ L
d￿r=￿r is not only positive but bigger than
￿r=(1 ￿ ￿r). In particular we have:
Proposition 6 An increase in the tax rate on capital income whose proceeds are
used to reduce the tax on labor income will increase growth, given determinacy,
























and, regardless of the level of ￿w, is








Proof. See Appendix B.
To understand intuitively the conditions we recall that the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply is increasing in ￿, for ￿ > 1, so the tax will provoke a stronger
positive e⁄ect on employment and on the gross of tax interest rate if ￿ is higher.
The condition is easier to satisfy the higher is ￿. In fact when the wage net of
tax and ~ L go up and therefore labor income goes up, the increase on pro￿ts is
￿ times the increase in labor income. This means that the higher is ￿, coeteris
paribus, the higher the increase in the rate of interest (and therefore growth),
necessary to equate the PDV of pro￿ts from a new intermediate to the ￿xed
cost of its development.
3.3 E⁄ect on Welfare
Given ￿, the BGP rate of growth, and e L the BGP labor supply, it is possible to











12In the appendix B it is shown how to express V as a di⁄erentiable function of the
tax rate ￿r and of equilibrium employment ~ L (itself a function of ￿r). The e⁄ect
on welfare of an increase in ￿r is then positive if dV
d￿r is positive. To simplify





(1￿￿)d￿r signs as dV
d￿r but is easier to manipulate alge-
braically so we will use it. We have:
d(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])
(1 ￿ ￿)d￿r
=






@(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])
(1 ￿ ￿)@~ L
. (35)
In Appendix B we show the following:
@(log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ])
















h0 ~ L ￿ 1
(36)
and











Substituting (30), (36) and (37) in (35), we get:





















h0 ~ L ￿











The denominator of the expression on the RHS is always positive by 25 (and the
positivity of tax rates) and by (31), given B0(~ L) > 0. So the derivative signs as
the numerator of the expression on the RHS. Hence we arrive at the following:
Proposition 7 If B0(~ L) > 0, i.e. if the BGP equilibrium is determinate, the
su¢ cient and necessary condition for an increase in the tax rate on capital






















If a value for ￿r exist such that for this value (39) holds as an equality, while
it holds strictly for lower tax rates, (39) gives us an implicit expression for the
optimal tax rate, given the tax program.10
In appendix B we prove the following:
Proposition 8 If ￿ > 1, or 0 < ￿ < 1 and
(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L > 1
￿, it is possible for a
revenue neutral increase in the tax rate on capital income to increase welfare
while decreasing growth.
10Solving the Ramsey problem by chosing the instrumental variables (here the tax rates)
that maximize the indirect utility functions derived by the private agents reaction in a decen-
tralized economy is known as the dual formulation.
13This result goes against the widely held belief, that when growth is subopti-
mal, further decreasing it cannot possibly be a Pareto improvement, no matter
what static gains would go with the reduction, as the growth e⁄ects always
prevail by compounding over time. However, in the next section we will show
that our surprising ￿nding is more than a theoretical possibility and that for
speci￿cations of tastes and technology parameters commonly used in calibra-
tion exercises it is possible for the tax program to induce Pareto improvements
but reduce growth. In fact while raising a tax on savings always induces lower
growth in our simulations, not to tax them is generally ine¢ cient. The examples
we consider are also useful to con￿rm and further develop our intuitions on the
interpretation of the various mechanisms at work.
3.4 Model Speci￿cation and Calibration
We consider here the following class of functions for the disutility of labor:
h(L) = (1 ￿ L)1￿￿ (40)
where ￿ > 1 if ￿ > 1 or ￿ < 1 < ￿ + ￿ if 0 < ￿ < 1.
First we notice that when h is speci￿ed as in (40), (26) with B(~ L) = 0 gives
us the following value for employment in equilibrium:
~ L =
￿





￿ (1 ￿ ￿w)
￿+￿￿2
￿￿1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿r)
. (41)
To be more precise, ~ L as de￿ned in (41), will be equal to employment in a
BGP equilibrium if it is positive, less than 1 and consistent with positive growth
and with the TVC.
















When ￿ > 1, these conditions are su¢ cient as well as necessary, and in fact
the ￿rst, as well as the TVC, will always hold. When ￿ < 1, a further condition





2 (1 ￿ ￿r)
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. (43)
Finally, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy is:
￿w < 1 ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿r)(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (￿ + ￿ ￿ 2)
. (44)
Reverting all these inequalities we have necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
an indeterminate BGP equilibrium with positive growth.
Proof. See appendix B.









so it is possible for both the second inequality in (42) and the inequality in (43)












again the inverses of the second inequality in (42) and of the inequality in (43)
will not be inconsistent.
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As we already now from the general case the e⁄ect on labor will be always
positive for ￿ > 1.
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(￿ + ￿ ￿ 2) ~ L
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ~ L)
￿ 0. (46)
To calculate the optimal asset income tax we plug in (46) the expression for ~ L



































The root of this non linear equation in ￿r gives us the optimal value of the tax,
for each six-tuple of parameters f￿;￿;g;￿;￿;C1g. For all the parameterizations
we consider, the expression on the LHS of the equation is always decreasing in
￿r for 0 ￿ ￿r ￿ 1, so the stationary point of the welfare function by equating it
to zero we ￿nd does indeed correspond to a maximum.
We now use (47) to calculate the optimal tax rates for reasonable values of
the parameters. We are completely aware that this model is not rich enough
in number of variables to ￿t the data well. So the aim of our exercise cannot
be the ￿nding of precise quantitative results, but rather the understanding of
possible mechanisms of action of policy not noticed before in the literature.
11When( 41) is true, (31) will be true as well, so we do not have to check that it is respected
.
15Several objects needed for the calculations have closed real-world counter-
parts so their calibration is relatively straightforward, while our other choices in
feeding numbers to the model follow related studies, especially of R&D models
(especially Comin and Gertler 2006, Jones and Williams 2000, Strulik 2007 and
Zeng and Zhang 2007).





imply values for r and C1 (through 29), for ￿w (through 25), and for ￿ (through
41). We then solve (47), given the values f￿;￿;￿;g;￿;C1g.
For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and time preference parame-
ter ￿, we follow Zeng and Zhang (2007/ ) and set ￿ = 1:5 in our baseline economy.
The former is closer to the value used in DSGE models of OECD economies than
to the microeconometric estimates of the parameter( the microeconometric ev-
idence on the parameter generally reporting much lower values than unity (see
Alan and Browning 2010 for a recent study). 12 As in most studies we set our
central for the rate of time discount ￿ equal to 0.04 and alternatively to 0.03
and 0.05. Coming to labor supply range of values for labor supply, in 2005 the
average US worker used 21 percent (24 percent) of her (his) time endowment to
work, while the German one 13 percent.13 So we choose 0.17 as our benchmark
value and use f0:13;0:21g for alternative parameterizations.
Coming to the the value of 1=￿, which is the monopoly markup on interme-
diates, we infer it from the ratio of intermediate consumption to gross output,
which is ￿2 in our model. The US intermediate consumption takes up around
0.45 of gross output, hence the mark-up 1=￿ is set at 1.49. This value exceeds
the range [1.05,1.37] used by Jones and Williams (2000) but is lower than the
1.6 used by Comin and Gertler (2006). They note that while direct evidence is
missing, given the specialized nature of these products an appropriate number
for 1=￿ would be at the high range of the estimates of markups in the literature
for other types of goods.14 The other values we consider for the ratio of inter-
mediate consumption to gross output in our sensitivity analysis are f0:40;0:50g.
For the initial growth rate, we use 2 percent, as the values used in related
researches include 1.25 percent (Jones and Williams 2000), 1.75 percent (Strulik
2007), 2 percent (Mankiw and Weinzierl 2006) and 3 percent (Zeng and Zhang
2007).
Again following Jones and Williams (2000), the benchmark for the steady-
state interest rate is set to 7.0 percent, which represents the average real return
on the stock market over the last century in the US, and let it vary between 4.0
12In fact logarithmic speci￿cation is often adopted for the period utility function, so as
to match the observed variability of output, working hours, and investment observed, in the
US economy, while a value of 1.6 is estimated by Smets and Wouters (2006) for European
economies.
13Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, current Population Survey, March 2005. For
further discussion see chapter 2 of Borjas (2009).
14Zeng and Zhang (2007) assume a benchmark value of ￿ at 0.3, leading to a mark-up as big
as 3.33. Cross-country comparisons show that in some other OECD countries the estimated
markup value is higher than in the US. For example, Beccarello (1997) estimates the markup
for UK at 1.47. Neiss (2001) estimates for 24 OECD countries the mean of the markup to be
2.03 with standard deviation 0.78.
16percent and 10.0 percent.
The average ratio of consolidated government expenditure to GDP over the
period 1995-2009 is 36.34 percent for the US, 47.47 percent for Germany and
53.21 percent for France. 15 We de￿ne this ratio as the variable gN ￿ g(1 ￿
￿2);and take 40 percent as our benchmark for it.
For our baseline case we consider an initial capital income tax rate of 25
percent, close to the average tax rate on capital income estimated by McDaniel
for the US in the period 1995-2007.
Our choices and results as regards the baseline economy are summarized in
Table 1:
Table 1: Baseline Economy: Parameterization and Results
Parameters and Steady State Variables Set Value
rate of time discount: ￿ 0.04
initial labor: L 0.17
intermediate consumption to gross output ratio: ￿2 0.45
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (inverse): ￿ 1.5
government expenditure to GDP ratio: gN 0.40
initial capital income tax rate: ￿r 0.25
GDP per capita growth: ￿ 0.02
Steady State Variables under Optimal Taxation
optimal capital income tax rate:b ￿r 0.3041
optimal labor income tax rate: b ￿w 0.4643
optimal labor: ^ L 0.1774
optimal growth: ^ ￿ 0.0185
A ￿rst comment is that the capital income tax rate associated with maximum
utility b ￿r; at 30.41 percent is higher than the initial rate but not hugely so. So
one can say that the prescription arising from our simple model are in line with
the levels of capital income taxation observed in the real world. Under our
scheme, an increase in welfare is consistent with a negative growth e⁄ect. This
is especially interesting because in this model the market equilibrium generates
an ine¢ ciently low growth rate (as shown in next section), while there is a
generally shared view that growth e⁄ects always tend to prevail over level e⁄ects,
as regards their impact on welfare. This is de￿nitely not the case here.
We now move to some sensitivity analysis, so as to clarify the role of the
various parameters . Our alternative parameterizations and results are reported
in Table 2.
15Data source: Consolidated Government Expenditure, OECD.
17Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
b ￿r b ￿w b L b ￿
￿=0.03 0.2731 0.4851 0.1731 0.026
￿=0.05 0.3516 0.4325 0.1731 0.0044
L=0.13 0.3162 0.4652 0.1373 0.0183
L=0.21 0.2917 0.4726 0.2167 0.0188
￿2=0.40 0.2783 0.477 0.1736 0.0192
￿2=0.50 0.3257 0.4525 0.1811 0.0180
gN=0.35 0.2443 0.4209 0.1693 0.0202
gN=0.45 0.3617 0.5092 0.1886 0.0174
￿=1.1 0.2166 0.52 0.1661 0.0216
￿=2 0.3795 0.4138 0.1894 0.086
Summing up, plausible calibrations of our model imply that the optimal tax
rate on capital will not in general be zero. In fact,in many of the cases we
consider the optimal tax rate is even higher than the initial 26 percent.
We can now draw a detailed map of the e⁄ects at work to deliver our results
and on the role of the various parameters in shaping them. We can see that
the optimal ￿r is increasing in ￿;gN;and ￿ and decreasing in initial L and the
markup 1/￿.
On impact, lowering the tax on the wage while increasing the tax on interest
will cause labor supply to increase, because of the positive substitution e⁄ect, in
the absence of an income e⁄ect, and assuming the e⁄ect of the complementarity
between consumption and leisure is not too strong.16The increase is also the
e⁄ect of the substitution between leisure and consumption, when the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is less than one. The increased labor supply induces
a higher demand for the intermediate goods. Since the price of intermediate
goods is greater than their marginal cost, increased demand for an intermediate
good has a ￿rst order bene￿t for its inventor. As previously seen this spillover
from labor to pro￿ts is increasing in ￿. The increase in pro￿ts induces a higher
demand for investment in R&D so the interest rate will rise. But the after-tax
interest rate will generally ( but not always) be smaller than the interest rate
with a zero tax on capital income. The BGP growth rate, as a monotonically
increasing function of the after-tax interest rate, also decreases. As in the model
a positive externality is associated with the invention activity driving growth,
this decrease lowers welfare.
The parameter ￿ also has an e⁄ect on the second externality in the model.
The e⁄ect of an invention on the present discounted value of income is given by
the cost of inventing divided by the income share of capital, that is ￿ (1 + ￿)￿￿1,
while the inventor only considers the part of the contribution to production that
goes to capital income, that is ￿. The spillover here is represented by ￿￿￿1.
16In fact for ￿ < 1; leisure and consumption are complements, so the decrease in the relative
price of consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow, leading to more consumption
today could in theory lead to more, rather than less leisure. However this never happens in
our calibrated examples.
18Clearly this is decreasing in ￿: the higher the share of pro￿ts the lower the
dynamic externality.
Since the tax shift from labor to capital helps to internalize the static
spillover (positively related to ￿), while worsening the dynamic spillover (nega-
tively related to ￿), a higher ￿ makes for a higher optimal tax on capital income,
through this double action.
To explain the role of ￿ in determining the optimal tax rates, again we must
bear in mind that the advantage of pushing up the tax on capital and down the
tax on labor is contingent on the increase in labor. A bigger increase in labor
will make for a bigger reduction in the monopoly distortion and a relatively less
important worsening of the appropriability failure. The increase depends on the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, whose value is increasing in ￿ (when ￿ > 1)
as shown in (32). Similarly, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is decreasing
in L:Most of the values for "F implied by our calibrations are located around
2. In particular, in the benchmark parametric space, the Frisch elasticity is
2.38. No consensus exists on a single number for the Frisch elasticity, as values
used in macroeconomic calibrations to be consistent with observed ￿ uctuations
in employment over the business cycle are much larger than microeconometric
studies would suggest. The values arising in our examples, are at the lower end
of the values used in the macro studies. 17
Moreover, for a given e⁄ect of the tax program on the net interest rate,
the higher is ￿ the lower will be the e⁄ect on the growth rate and therefore
the less important the worsening of the dynamic ine¢ ciency: a lower intertem-
poral substitution elasticity of consumption, means consumers weigh more the
current increase in consumption (which is lower than future consumption in a
growing economy) than the decrease in future consumption( which is higher).
So, when the instantaneous consumption is increased along with employment
this increment is given more weight than the future loss.
With higher subjective discount rate ￿, although consumption will grow at
a lower rate with a higher tax on capital, this dynamic loss is discounted more
heavily thus making for a higher tax on capital income.
As to gN, the ratio of government consumption to GDP, intuitively, the
higher it is, the higher the factor income taxes should be, so as to internalize
the externality that both working and saving create in this model, by inducing
more public spending.
17In King and Rebelo (1999) the needed elasticity is 4. This is also the value used by Prescott
(2004) to explain di⁄erences in hours worked across OECD due to taxes. One explanation for
this divergence between micro and macroestimates is that indivisible labor generates extensive
margin responses that are not captured in micro studies of hours choices (e.g. Rogerson and
Wallenius 2009). This explanation is however questioned by Chetty et al. (2011), whose
synthesis of the micro evidence points to Frisch elasticities of 0.5 on the intensive and 0.25 on
the extensive margin. Imai and Keane (2004) ￿nd that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply may
be as high as four, when taking into account that measured wages are less than the shadow
wage because the second also re￿ects the value of on-the-job human capital accumulation.
Finally Domeij and Floden (2006) point out that ignoring borrowing constraints will induce
a (50%) downward bias in elasticity estimates.
193.5 Comparison between the market economy and the so-
cial planner￿ s economy
In this subsection we compare the social planner￿ s equilibrium with the market
equilibrium. Our main aim is to rule out that our result on the possibility that
welfare is improved while the growth rate is reduced is due to the fact that the
BGP growth rate in the market economy is higher than the social optimum.
Variables keep the same meaning as in the market economy, but the index
s is used to show they characterize the social optimum. Let Xs ￿
R Ns
0 Xs(i)di,
where Xs(i) is the amount of each type of the intermediate goods in the social
planner￿ s economy and Xs is the total amount produced of such goods. Then

























where ￿ is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the social budget constraint.
The social planner decides on the optimal path of the control variables Ls, Cs,
and Xs(i), and that of the state variable Ns. The key optimality conditions are:






























































Ys(1 ￿ g) ￿ Cs ￿ Xs
￿Ns
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where the second equality uses equations (50), (51) and (55). We use ￿s to













This is di⁄erent from the analogous condition (31) in the market equilibrium.
We exploit this di⁄erence to compare the steady state labor supply in the social
planner￿ s economy and that in the decentralized economy. Given our speci￿ca-





L , which is a strictly
decreasing function of L. But then ￿￿1
￿￿1
1￿Ls
Ls < 1 < ￿￿1
￿￿1
1￿~ L
~ L (by 31 and 57),
where ~ L is equilibrium employment in the decentralized economy. We deduce
that the steady state labor supply in the social planner￿ s economy is larger than
in the market economy.
For optimal growth to be lower than growth in a market economy we would
need C1~ L(1￿￿r) > rs, and a fortiori, since Ls > ~ L, C1Ls(1￿￿r) > rs, or using















1￿￿. For realistic ￿ and g this would require a negative ￿r.
4 Conclusions
This study analyses how the tax burden should be distributed betwen factor in-
comes in the "lab equipment" model of endogenous technological progress, thus
complementing the study of ￿scal policy in this same model by Zeng and Zhang
(2007). We are then able to isolate a further reason why capital income taxa-
tion can be welfare increasing, thus making sense of the fact that in adavanced
economy tax rates on capital are generally well above the zero level generally
recommended by the literature. The reason is that in the model there are two
ine¢ ciencies, one related to the market power of ￿rms, the second related to the
appropriability problem related to the invention of new products. Shifting the
tax burden from labor to capital has opposite e⁄ects on these two distortions.
The increase in the interest income tax and the corresponding decrease in the
labor income tax changes the opportunity cost of leisure without any change in
disposable income, so labor supply will increase due to the substitution e⁄ect.
21Raising labor supply increases the quantity of goods produced by monopolistic
￿rms so that the welfare cost of monopoly is reduced. For plausible calibrations
of the model, the after-tax interest rate is decreasing in the tax rate on capital
and so the growth rate goes down, ie the second distortion(which consists in an
ine¢ ciently low rate of growth even with a zeo capital income tax) is worsened.
We have shown that the optimal tax on capital income is higher the higher the
elasticity of labor supply, the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption, the lower the income share of labor, the higher the rate of time
discount and the higher the ratio between goverment spending and income.
Our result shows that the sign of the growth e⁄ect of a tax program is not
necessarily the same as that of the welfare e⁄ect and that the two e⁄ects should
be analysed separatedly, even in models when growth is sub-optimal.
In future research we plan to explore the generality of the result along two
main directions: ie considering a richer tax structure that includes consumption
taxes, and considering a model of vertical rather than horizontal innovation.
Further developments would be considering home production and the depen-
dence of the marginal utility of leisure on its economy-wide average level.
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A Proofs for Section 2
A.1 Proof that V = ￿ in a growing economy.
V > ￿ is never possible because of the free entry assumption in the research
market. On the other hand if V < ￿, no research would be done so that _ N = 0,
and from the economy-wide resource constraint we would have Y ￿xN = C+gY ,
or, using (16) and (17),
C =
￿







Plugging this, together with (13), in (7), the equilibrium level of employment





1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ g
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿w)(￿ ￿ 1)
. (59)
26So if this equation had a solution for L between 0 and 1, this solution would
de￿ne the equilibrium level of employment in a growthless economy, Lng. Plug-
ging Lng in (58) and (19), the consumption level and the pro￿t level in this
growthless economy would also be given. With labor and consumption ￿xed
over time, the Euler equation (8) implies an interest rate equal to
￿
1￿￿r. Now









Vo > 0, or if, in other
words i.e. r￿ ￿
V0 > 0, then, by (20),
:
V
V > 0. So V will increase and, since ￿ and
r will stay the same, r ￿ ￿
V will increase as well, ie
:
V
V will be increasing. This
implies that in ￿nite time V will get to ￿, but then
:
V
V > 0 will be no longer
possible. It would then become pro￿table to invest in inventions and growth
would start. However this would require a jump in C and L (no longer dictated










Vo < 0 that is if r ￿ ￿
V < 0, V
would be decreasing at an increasing rate, reaching the value 0 in ￿nite time.










Vo , then Vo < ￿ would be the
equilibrium price of existing patents and the economy would never grow.
Summing up we can say that in a growing economy we must have V = ￿ at
all times.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the factor exhaustion condition that the wage bill plus total interest pay-
ments is equal to GDP, and the fact just established that growth requires V = ￿,
we have Y ￿xN = wL+r￿N, while substituting for C using equation (7), given





























+ (h0=h ￿ h00=h0) _ L. (61)
Plugging this expression for
_ C
C in (8) we obtain:
h
0
h _ L ￿ ￿ + r(1 ￿ ￿r)
￿




Finally if we substitute in (62) the expression for
_ N
N given by (60) we obtain:
_ L =
















h ￿ ￿(h0=h ￿ h00=h0)
27and using (21) we get (26) in the text.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is divided into two parts First we prove that B0(~ L) > 0 implies
uniquess and determinacy of the BGP, with no transitional dynamics to it.
Second we prove that if ￿ > 1 or if if ￿ < 1 and ￿w < 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿r)(1 ￿ ￿);
then B0(L) > 0; hence B0(~ L) > 0:
First part Given the de￿nition of B in (28) we can write














f(L) ￿ ￿￿ + C1L
￿









Any point of intersection, assuming it exists, between the two curves m and f,
both continuous and di⁄erentiable, de￿nes a BGP equilibrium ~ L. If B0(L) > 0
the m(L) curve always crosses the f(L) curve from below. But a continuous
function cannot cross another continuous function from below twice in a row.
This establishes uniqueness of equilibrium given its existence if B0(L) > 0:We
de￿ne the unique BGP equilibrium labor supply as e L:
To study the dynamic nature of a ￿xed point of (26), i.e. of BGP labor
supply, we have to sign d _ L(e L)=de L. If this derivative is positive the ￿xed point e L
is a repeller and the BGP is locally determinate. If d _ L(e L)=de L is negative then
e L is an attractor, i.e. there is local indeterminacy. A(L) as de￿ned in (27), is
always strictly positive for all values of L, by the negative de￿niteness condition
of the hessian of the utility function (4), so the di⁄erential equation (26) is










A(~ L) (since B(~ L) = 0). So B0(~ L) > 0 implies d _ L(e L)=de L > 0:
We have therefore established that if B0(L) > 0; the equilibrium value of
L, e L; will be unique and unstable. This implies that no other value of L is
consistent with the general equilibrium conditions. Since for a given L the ratio
between C and N is given, from (7) and (18), this means that in this model the
economy will always be on a BGP.
Second Part We now show that if ￿ > 1, or if ￿ < 1 and ￿w ￿ 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿);
we will have B0(L) > 0.
Given the de￿nition of B in (28), taking the derivative and grouping


















￿ ￿ 1 + ￿r
￿






The upper bound for g is 1 ￿ ￿2, which corresponds to the case in which all
net income Y ￿ xN =
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
Y , is con￿scated by the government, so that
￿r = 1 and ￿w = 1. However this upper bound for g is not a maximum, because
for any economic activity to take place we need g = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ "g, for some real
number "g in (0;1 ￿￿2], as production will not happen with a con￿scatory tax
rate on labor income, while there will be no growth with a con￿scatory tax rate
on interest income. So growth requires ￿r = 1 ￿ "￿r, with "￿r 2 R, 0 < "￿r ￿ 1
and ￿w = 1￿"￿w, with "￿w 2 R+=0. From g = 1￿￿2 ￿"g, from ￿w = 1￿"￿w
and from ￿w =
g







(1￿￿) > "￿w > 0.








1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ "g
1 ￿ ￿
￿￿






















































￿ = 1￿￿r > 0,
if ￿ > 1 the last expression is always positive so indeterminacy never obtains.

















So a necessary condition for B0(L) < 0 is ￿w > 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿r).







The condition (9) implies that the BGP rate of growth, ￿, is lower than r(1￿￿r).
(60) gives us:



























































h0 ~ L > 1.
B Proofs for Section 3
B.1 Tax e⁄ect on growth

















As we focus on the case B0(~ L) > 0, we need just the consider the sign of
the expression inside the square brackets. The expression can be written, using






(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿
￿












































To understand how the ￿rst inequality is obtained, notice the following. In
a growing economy ￿ _ N will be positive. From the resource constraint ￿ _ N =
Y ￿ xN ￿ C ￿ G, given Y ￿ xN = (1 ￿ ￿2)Y (by 16 and 17), substituting for
C its expression given by (7), after expressing the wage in terms of income by
(13) and rearranging we get:
￿ _ N = (1 ￿ ￿)Y
"
￿(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿
 








using also (25). So ￿ _ N > 0 implies, given 1 + ￿￿r ￿
g









So the ￿rst inequality in (64) comes just by using (65). The second inequality
in (64) is an immediate consequence of (5). Summing up a necessary condition
for
d￿
d￿r > 0 is then:
￿ >











As this lower bound on ￿ is a monotonically increasing function of ￿r, we can









d￿r is always negative.
30B.2 Proof of equations 36 and 37





￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
.
By using (7), (21) and (25) we can write:
C(0) = ￿N(0)










Using (29) we have:
￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) = r(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ ￿,
while by using (60) to get an expression for ￿, we obtain, again using (21):


































h0 ~ L ￿ 1
￿. (67)
We have:
log[(1 ￿ ￿)V ]
1 ￿ ￿
































h0 ￿ ~ L
￿
:
From here we calculate:
































h0 ~ L ￿ 1
,
which is (36) in the text. We also have:























31which is (37) in the text. Therefore:


































































￿ ￿ 1 + ￿r
￿

















































￿￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿r)
￿
(￿￿1)h






























B.3 Proof of proposition 8
Let us just notice the di⁄erence between (33) and (39) is just in the second term
of the expressions on the left of the inequality sign. In fact this term in (33)
is equal to its analogous in (39) divided by
￿(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L (which is always positive
by 2 and 3). The term is always negative, since 1 + ￿￿r ￿
g
1￿￿ > 0 (by 25),






> 0 (by 5). So a positive growth e⁄ect will imply
a positive welfare e⁄ect if
￿(￿￿1)h
h0 ~ L > 1. We know by (31) that this always the
case if ￿ > 1.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 9
The ￿rst inequality in (42) just ensures that L;as given in (41), respects its upper
bound of one, as can be seen by noticing that with h given by (40), the denom-

















C1 (see 63), and therefore that under determi-
nacy, ie when B0(~ L) > 0 (which immediately gives us 44), this denominator is
positive. indeed, this inequality always holds for ￿ > 1. For positive growth
32we also need the net interest rate to be bigger than the rate of time discount
or C1(1 ￿ ￿l
k)~ L > ￿ by (29). Just by using (41) when the denominator of the
fraction in (41) is positive (ie under determinacy) this second condition gives us
the second inequality in (42). The TVC that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ < 0 is always true
for ￿ ￿ 0 with ￿ > 1;however when ￿ < 1, by using (29) to express ￿ in terms
of L and using 41, assuming determinacy, the TVC can be found to impose
(43). The proof of the statement on the indeterminate equilibrium is obtained
proceding in a strictly analogous way but noticing that the denominator of the
fraction on the left-hand side of 41 is negative under indeterminacy, ie when
B0(~ L)
C1 < 0.
33